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 Mediation results supported core tenets of cognitive models of OCD and the 
significance of reducing thought-action fusion (TAF) for improving obsessive-
compulsive (OC) and associated symptoms. 
 TAF-related cognitive dissonance can be emphasized beforehand via a behavioral 
experiment to enhance therapeutic effects of TAF-specific psychoeducation. 


















We designed a mock electroencephalography (EEG)-based behavioral experiment to induce 
cognitive dissonance about thought-action fusion (TAF). We aimed to determine whether 
adding this component to TAF-specific psychoeducation would enhance its efficacy in 
reducing TAF, inflated responsibility, and obsessive-compulsive (OC) and associated 
symptoms. The maintenance of potential reductions was also examined. Specifically, we 
compared a combined intervention condition against a TAF-specific psychoeducation-only 
condition, as well as against a control condition, with an unselected undergraduate sample. 
More broadly, TAF and inflated responsibility were investigated as mutual mediators in their 
relationships with OC symptoms, with baseline and change scores. Findings included: (1) 
greatest dissonance generation with the combined intervention; (2) greater post-intervention 
reductions in the two intervention conditions in TAF, inflated responsibility, OC symptom 
severity, and distress and urge to neutralize upon thinking unpleasant thoughts, compared 
with the control condition; (3) incremental reductions in most aforementioned variables and 
maintenance at one-month follow-up with the combined intervention; (4) dissonance 
reduction via TAF reduction being validated as an intervention mechanism; (5) partial mutual 
mediation within aforementioned relationships with baseline scores; and (6) post-message 
change in TAF fully mediating the relationship between post-message change in inflated 
responsibility and change in OC symptom severity at one-month follow-up, while the 
alternative mediator role of change in inflated responsibility was not supported. Our findings 
therefore demonstrated the importance of cognitive dissonance as a manipulable construct in 
improving the reduction of OC beliefs and symptoms. The core tenets of cognitive models of 
OCD were also supported; specifically, targeting TAF beliefs will have a significant impact 
on OC symptom improvement. 
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Cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) emphasize dysfunctional 
beliefs about intrusive thoughts in the development of obsessions and compulsions. These 
beliefs include inflated responsibility for normal intrusions (Rachman & de Silva, 1978; 
Salkovskis, 1985, 1989, 1996), and thought-action fusion (TAF; Rachman, 1993, 1997). TAF 
comprises TAF-likelihood-self/-others (i.e., having unpleasant thoughts increases the 
likelihood of unpleasant events happening to the self and/or others) and TAF-moral beliefs 
(i.e., having unpleasant thoughts is morally equivalent to performing unpleasant actions; 
Rachman, Thordarson, Shafran, & Woody, 1995).There is strong evidence for these models. 
For example, consistent associations between OC symptom severity and TAF and inflated 
responsibility have been reported (Berle & Starcevic, 2005; Salkovskis et al., 2000; Shafran 
& Rachman, 2004; Smari & Holmsteinsson, 2001). Studies have also shown synchronous 
post-treatment reductions in these beliefs and OC symptom severity (Fisher & Wells, 2005; 
Freeston et al., 1997; Jónsson, Hougaard, & Bennedsen, 2011; Rhéaume & Ladouceur, 2000; 
Sookman & Pinard, 1999; Storchheim & O’Mahony, 2006; for a review, see Abramowitz, 
Brigidi, & Roche, 2001). There is thus a need to address dysfunctional beliefs in OCD 
treatment. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of research on methods to target these cognitive 
biases.  
TAF-specific psychoeducation is a preliminary method that has been developed as a 
efficacious means of reducing TAF, and by association, inflated responsibility, neutralization 
behaviors, and thought suppression (Marino-Carper, Negy, Burns, & Lunt, 2010; Zucker, 
Craske, Barrios, & Holguin, 2002). However, the durability of the effects of TAF-specific 
psychoeducation has only been researched in one study (i.e., Marino-Carper et al., 2010). 
Moreover, the authors reported that the therapeutic gains of TAF-specific psychoeducation 
were not maintained at two-week follow-up. This suggests the need to identify extra 
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components to increase the efficacy of TAF-specific psychoeducation. To address this, the 
present study draws upon the dissonance induction-then-reduction principle of psychotherapy 
(Tryon & Misurell, 2008), as well as behavioral experiments, to determine whether the 
effects of TAF-specific psychoeducation can be improved and maintained at a longer follow-
up interval. This will provide information on how these established psychotherapeutic 
concepts can be combined in a specific manner for enhanced and durable therapeutic impact 
on OC beliefs and symptoms. Additionally, we focused on an unselected sample, given 
evidence of dimensionality in OC beliefs and symptoms (Abramowitz et al., 2010; Berle & 
Starcevic, 2005; Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, & Gagnon, 1992; Ladouceur et al., 1995). 
The dissonance induction-then-reduction principle of psychotherapy (Tryon & 
Misurell, 2008) describes how cognitive dissonance (i.e., psychological discomfort arising 
from conflicting beliefs, attitudes, and/or behaviors; Festinger, 1957) permeates 
psychological treatment of anxiety and depression. For example, cognitive restructuring in 
depression creates dissonance in clients, which is reduced by assimilating adaptive appraisals. 
Additionally, previous research has shown that health, social, and eating disorder-related 
attitudes and behaviors are responsive to dissonance-based interventions that operate 
according to this principle (Becker, Smith, & Ciao, 2006; Freijy & Kothe, 2013; Stice, 
Butryn, Rohde, Shaw, & Marti, 2013). The principle’s template-like nature thus makes it 
transposable to OCD treatment. However, cognitive dissonance has never been empirically 
broached in the design of psychological interventions for OCD, much less the narrowed-
down aim of inducing dissonance about TAF beliefs. Behavioral experiments have previously 
been tailored for disconfirming dysfunctional OC beliefs (Hyman & Pedrick, 2010; Julien, 
O'Connor, & Aardema, 2007; Wilhelm & Steketee, 2006), and are hence suitable for 
dissonance-based modification. 
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Therefore, we sought to examine the potential efficacy of a dissonance-based 
behavioral experiment, in combination with TAF-specific psychoeducation, in reducing TAF, 
inflated responsibility, OC symptom severity, and associated symptoms (e.g., distress and 
urge to neutralize upon thinking unpleasant thoughts; Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant, & 
Teachman, 1996). In the aforementioned combined intervention condition, the behavioral 
experiment trials are designed to induce conflict between initially activated TAF beliefs and 
the later inability to “cause” unpleasant outcomes (i.e., TAF-related cognitive dissonance), 
and should motivate the individual toward dissonance reduction via TAF reduction. In other 
words, dissonance reduction should occur via belief disconfirmation (Festinger, Riecken, & 
Schachter, 1956), in which confrontation with information inconsistent with activated beliefs 
produces dissonance that can be resolved by altering such beliefs. We predicted that the prior 
addition of the dissonance-based behavioral experiment would create a psychological state 
highly receptive to subsequent TAF-specific psychoeducation, resulting in enhanced 
intervention efficacy, more so than with simple presentation of the latter. As such, we 
compared two intervention conditions against each other (i.e., combined vs. TAF-specific 
psychoeducation-only), and against a control condition, in terms of effects on constructs of 
interest. To avoid the limitations of cross-sectional data, as well as to investigate effects at a 
longer interval, we also assessed the same constructs at one-month follow-up. Additionally, 
in order to more precisely assess changes in certain constructs across time, a combination of 
process and scale measures were administered. 
Our specific hypotheses follow: 
(1) Mean TAF-related cognitive dissonance was hypothesized to peak after behavioral 
experiment trials only in the combined intervention condition. In both intervention 
conditions, dissonance was hypothesized to then drop after presentation of the TAF-specific 
psychoeducational message, and remain level at follow-up. No fluctuation was expected in 
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the control condition. The two intervention conditions were also hypothesized to elicit greater 
post-intervention reductions in dissonance, compared with the control condition. 
(2)  In the combined intervention condition, mean process measure-assessed TAF and 
perceived responsibility, distress, and urge to neutralize upon thinking unpleasant thoughts 
were hypothesized to peak (i.e., highest among all conditions) during behavioral experiment 
trials, as an indication of manipulation validity. These variables were hypothesized to then 
drop substantially after message presentation (more than in the psychoeducation-only 
condition), and remain level at follow-up (for evidence of durable dissonance-induced belief 
change, see Draycott & Dabbs, 1998; Sénémeaud & Somat, 2009). In the psychoeducation-
only condition, these variables were hypothesized to drop moderately post-message, with 
these reductions not being maintained at follow-up. No fluctuations were expected in the 
control condition. Furthermore, we expected that the two intervention conditions will elicit 
greater post-intervention reductions in these variables, compared with the control condition. 
(3)  In the combined intervention condition, mean scale-assessed TAF and inflated 
responsibility were hypothesized to drop substantially from baseline post-message (more than 
in the psychoeducation-only condition), and remain level at follow-up. Mean OC symptom 
severity and general psychological distress were hypothesized to drop substantially from 
baseline at follow-up (more than in the psychoeducation-only condition). In the 
psychoeducation-only condition, scale-assessed TAF and inflated responsibility were 
hypothesized to drop moderately from baseline post-message, with this reduction not being 
maintained at follow-up. Mean OC symptom severity and general psychological distress were 
hypothesized to drop moderately from baseline at follow-up. No reductions were expected in 
the control condition. 
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(4) Finally, we argue that dissonance reduction via TAF reduction is a plausible 
mechanism for intervention efficacy. Therefore, TAF reduction must at least mediate the  
relationship between dissonance reduction and OC symptom reduction, if not reductions in 
other pertinent constructs, across conditions. 
More broadly, there is substantial evidence for the relationship between TAF and OC 
symptom severity being mediated by inflated responsibility (Altın & Gençöz, 2011; 
Matthews, Reynolds, & Derisley, 2006), supporting cognitive models of OCD. 
Comparatively, less evidence is available for reverse mediation by TAF (e.g., O’Kearney, 
1998). We therefore examined whether both mediation models were replicable, with baseline 
and change scores, to clarify the relative importance of either belief to OCD. The validity of 
additional pertinent mediators was simultaneously studied. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred and forty introductory psychology undergraduates [89 females: 70 
Singaporean Chinese (SC), 10 Singaporean Malay (SM), 9 Singaporean Indian (SI); 51 
males: 40 SC, 6 SM, 5 SI] from a Singaporean university participated for course credit. Mean 
age was 20.65 years (SD = 1.59). Eligibility criteria were: normal/corrected-to-normal vision; 
English as a first language; electroencephalography (EEG) naivety; being and having at least 
a parent who is able-bodied and generally physically healthy; and psychopharmacological 
treatment naivety. Participants were randomly assigned to the combined intervention, TAF-
specific psychoeducation-only, or control condition. In the combined intervention condition, 
a mock EEG setup modified from Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, and Spaan’s (1999) procedure 
was adopted to conduct the behavioral experiment trials, because it is conducive for 
immersive TAF belief-testing. Cognitive dissonance about one’s TAF beliefs should be 
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highly generated by pitting initial thought-congruent trials (i.e., six trials in which outcomes 
are manipulated to be the same as initial unpleasant thoughts, exemplifying and activating 
TAF beliefs) against subsequent thought-incongruent ones (i.e., six trials in which safe or 
neutral outcomes are presented instead, countering TAF beliefs). The mock EEG setup was 
also implemented in the psychoeducation and control conditions for procedural equivalence, 
and acted as a platform for non-behavioral experiment trials. Across conditions, 
questionnaires were administered four times in the initial session (baseline, after first six 
trials, after next six trials, and post-message), and once at one-month follow-up. 
A separate sample of 30 undergraduates from the same population provided 100mm 
visual analog scale ratings of stimuli and measure characteristics from 0 (not at all) to 100 
(very much) on a computer, in validation of stimuli and process measures employed here. 
Stimuli and Equipment 
Scenarios, proposed thoughts, and outcomes. Twelve TAF-relevant sets of 
scenarios, proposed thoughts, and congruent and incongruent outcomes (four of each TAF 
domain type), based on the Thought-Action Fusion Scale (TAFS; Shafran, Thordarson, & 
Rachman, 1996), were presented in the combined intervention condition. The same sets 
(excluding outcomes) were presented in the psychoeducation-only and control conditions. 
The choice of the familiar target (father/mother; see Berman, Wheaton, Fabricant, Jacobson, 
& Abramowitz, 2011) in TAF-likelihood-others trials was left open. Appendix A displays 
these stimuli. Each set type was more relevant to its TAF domain, compared with the other 
types (ps range from less than .001 to marginal significance at less than .026), with no 
differences among the other types, all ps > .05. An exception was that TAF-moral sets were 
only more TAF-moral-relevant than TAF-likelihood-self sets, p < .001. This is attributable to 
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overlap between TAF domains (see Berle & Starcevic, 2005). Set types were equated on 
potential for distress, comprehensibility, and imageability, all Fs < 1. 
Messages. A digitally recorded TAF-specific psychoeducational message modified 
slightly from Zucker et al. (2002) and Marino-Carper et al. (2010) was presented in the two 
intervention conditions. A digitally recorded non-TAF-relevant message was presented in the 
control condition. Appendix B displays these messages. The TAF-specific psychoeducational 
message was more relevant to all three TAF domains than the non-TAF-relevant message (all 
ps < .05). Both were matched on comprehensibility (t < 1), and had the same audio length (97 
sec). 
Mock EEG setup. The mock EEG setup comprised electrodes attached to an EEG 
cap, and recording machinery linked to a computer.  
Measures 
The following scales, self-constructed process measures, and check items were 
compiled into questionnaires for each assessment interval. 
Thought-Action Fusion Scale (TAFS; Shafran et al., 1996). The TAFS is a reliable, 
valid self-report measure of TAF-likelihood-self, TAF-likelihood-others, and TAF-moral 
beliefs. Respondents endorse 19 statements from 0 (disagree strongly) to 4 (agree strongly). 
Higher scores indicate stronger TAF beliefs. Baseline Cronbach’s alpha was .89. 
Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000). The RAS is a reliable, 
valid 26-statement self-report measure of responsibility beliefs. Respondents endorse each 
statement from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Higher scores indicate more inflated 
responsibility beliefs. Baseline Cronbach’s alpha was .88. 
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Dimensional Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (DOCS; Abramowitz et al., 2010). The 
DOCS is a reliable, valid self-report instrument assessing four OC symptom dimensions 
(contamination-related concerns, responsibility for harm, unacceptable thoughts, and the need 
for symmetry/completeness/exactness) on five parameters of severity spanning the past 
month. Respondents rate the 20 items from 0 (no symptoms at all) to 4 (extreme symptoms). 
Higher scores indicate greater OC symptom severity. Baseline Cronbach’s alpha was .91. 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales, 21-item version (DASS-21; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995). The DASS-21 is a reliable, valid self-report measure of depressive, 
anxiety, and stress symptoms spanning the past week. Scores from the three subscales [each 
with seven items rated from 0 (non-applicability) to 3 (extremely high applicability of 
symptom to self)] are summed to give an indication of general psychological distress. Higher 
scores indicate greater distress. Baseline Cronbach’s alpha was .92. 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). 
The MCSDS is a 33-item self-report instrument assessing social desirability bias, which can 
affect questionnaire data validity (Huang, Liao, & Chang, 1998). More socially desirable 
responses to the improbable statements indicate greater bias. Baseline Cronbach’s alpha was 
.70. 
Preference for Consistency-Brief Scale (PFC-B; Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 
1995). The PFC-B is an abbreviated self-report measure of aversion to discrepancy and 
inclination toward non-conflicting cognitions and/or behaviors, covariates for dissonance 
generation. Nine statements are rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Higher 
scores, after appropriate reverse-scoring, indicate greater preference for consistency. Baseline 
Cronbach’s alpha was .87. 
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Process measures. Process measures include those of the three TAF domains (self, 
others, moral), TAF-related cognitive dissonance [the three-item Dissonance Thermometer 
(Devine, Tauer, Barron, Elliot, & Vance, 1999; Elliot & Devine, 1994) and one item 
assessing psychological conflict, all referencing responses to TAF process measures], and 
perceived responsibility, distress, and urge to neutralize upon thinking unpleasant thoughts. 
Participants respond on 100mm visual analog scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very 
much). Appendix C.1. displays these measures. Each TAF process measure type was more 
relevant to its TAF domain, compared with the other types, all ps < .002, with no differences 
between the other types, all ps > .05. TAF process measure types were equated on 
comprehensibility, F < 1. 
Check items. An EEG-related knowledge criterion check item and three true/false 
comprehension check items for both messages were included. Dissonance precondition check 
items assessed voluntariness and responsibility for participation (both referencing the 
session), and effort expenditure (referencing thought engagement). These are well-researched 
preconditions (Axsom & Cooper, 1985; Beauvois & Joule, 1999; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; 
Gosling, Denizeau, & Oberlé, 2006; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976), and hence covariates, for 
dissonance generation. Additionally, a check item for adherence to proposed unpleasant 
thoughts in the previous six trials was administered twice. Except for the message 
comprehension and thought adherence items, participants responded to all aforementioned 
items on 100mm visual analog scales. Appendix C.2. displays these items. 
Procedure 
The initial and follow-up sessions were conducted individually and entirely on a 
computer in an enclosed laboratory. In the initial session, participants were informed about 
the general purpose (i.e., examining relationships between certain beliefs and behaviors) and 
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procedure of the study, and their written consents were obtained. Participants first completed 
a questionnaire, and were then fitted with an EEG cap connected to the rest of the mock EEG 
setup. Condition-specific details follow. 
Combined intervention condition. The combined condition involved both the 
induction of TAF-related cognitive dissonance with behavioral experiment trials and TAF-
specific psychoeducation. Twelve behavioral experiment trials with manipulated outcomes 
were randomly presented: six thought-congruent trials (two from each TAF domain), then six 
thought-incongruent trials (the other two from each domain). Each trial was sequenced as: (1) 
scenario presentation; (2) presentation of a proposed unpleasant thought about an outcome for 
that scenario which participants engaged in for 30 seconds; (3) outcome presentation. 
Participants were encouraged to try their best at engaging in each thought and any 
accompanying related imagery. Participants were instructed that the slightest match between 
their brain activity as recorded by the EEG machinery and a predefined pattern for each 
thought phase will result in real-time translation of that activity via software into the outcome 
they had thought about for that scenario. They were also told that if there was no match, a 
default outcome will occur. It was emphasized to participants that only they determine 
whether the outcomes they thought about will occur, and that the main aim of these trials was 
to allow them to test any beliefs they might have about the thoughts they engaged in, in 
relation to the outcomes that follow. The trials began after participants chose a parental target 
(i.e., father/mother, who is able-bodied and generally physically healthy) for the TAF-
likelihood-others trials, and clarified any doubts they had about the procedure. Participants 
completed a questionnaire after every six trials. They were then presented the TAF-specific 
psychoeducational message. Participants subsequently completed another questionnaire. 
TAF-specific psychoeducation-only and control conditions. The procedure in these 
two conditions was the same as that for the combined intervention condition, except non-
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behavioral experiment trials were carried out (i.e., only scenarios and proposed unpleasant 
thoughts, without instructions on belief-testing). Participants were also told that EEG 
recording was conducted for another unrelated study on signal pattern norms for the 
unpleasant thoughts. Additionally, the non-TAF-relevant message was presented instead in 
the control condition. 
Remaining general procedure. Before the trials, participants confirmed that both 
parents fulfilled the criteria, and chose the closer parent. Different questionnaires were 
administered at different intervals: all scales and all process measures at baseline; all process 
measures and the thought adherence check item after each set of six trials; the TAFS, RAS, 
all process measures, and all check items (except the thought adherence item) after message 
presentation; and all scales (except the SDS and PFC-B), all process measures, and 
dissonance precondition check items at follow-up. After post-message questionnaire 
completion, participants were debriefed on the use of mock EEG, and that bad events after 
the initial session were purely coincidental and unrelated to the unpleasant thoughts they had 
engaged in. Participants in the combined intervention condition were additionally debriefed 
on the manipulated nature of the outcomes with an emphasis against the retention of TAF 
beliefs. Participants did not express suspicion about the mock EEG setup when verbally 
probed. At follow-up, participants confirmed that they remained psychopharmacological 
treatment-naive, and that the parental target still fulfilled the criteria. Scales were first 
completed, followed by six non-EEG scenario-thought trials (two of each TAF domain type; 
same parental target) across conditions, then the completion of the rest of the questionnaire. 
Finally, participants in the control condition received the TAF-specific psychoeducation, and 
all were debriefed, again on the coincidental nature of bad events after the follow-up session. 
Results 
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Data from all participants were analyzed. This was because EEG-related knowledge 
was low across conditions (M = 17.83, SD = 19.73), and full message comprehension and 
thought adherence were attained. No missing data were observed for all measures across 
intervals. 
Analyses of TAF-Related Cognitive Dissonance and Intervention Efficacy 
Three (condition: combined, psychoeducation-only, control) × five/three/two (time: 
baseline, after the first six trials, after the next six trials, post-message, follow-up; excluding 
the second and third intervals for scale-assessed TAF and inflated responsibility, and 
additionally excluding the fourth interval for OC symptom severity and general psychological 
distress) mixed analyses of covariances (ANCOVAs) with post-hoc tests of simple main 
effects and planned contrasts with Bonferroni correction were conducted to test our 
hypotheses.1 Post-hoc tests involved comparing each measure between intervals within each 
condition to ascertain trends and maintenance of intervention efficacy. Planned contrasts 
involved comparing each measure between conditions at the end of the first or last six trials 
to assess manipulation validity, and/or comparing within-initial session or baseline-follow-up 
difference scores between conditions to assess intervention efficacy. 
 TAF-related cognitive dissonance. When averaged across assessment intervals, 
total Dissonance Thermometer scores correlated highly with psychological discomfort scores, 
                                                          
1 Covariates were selected according to a priori logic and suggestions by Dalecki and Willits (1991). Covariates 
for ANCOVAs for TAF-related cognitive dissonance included scores summed across intervals for all scales, 
other process measures, and dissonance preconditions, as well as EEG-related knowledge. The same covariates 
were entered for ANCOVAs for other process measures (except when the variable is the dependent variable), 
excluding dissonance preconditions. Preference for consistency was a covariate only for analyses of TAF 
process measure scores. Additionally, the same covariates were entered for ANCOVAs for scales (except when 
the variable is the dependent variable), excluding dissonance, dissonance preconditions, and preference for 
consistency. Covariates for planned contrasts for dissonance were baseline/post-message scores for covariates 
from corresponding ANCOVAs. The same covariates (baseline scores only) were entered for planned contrasts 
for other process measures and scales; preference for consistency was entered only for analysis of TAF process 
measure difference scores. 
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r = .90, p < .001. Both measures were thus similarly valid indicators of TAF-related cognitive 
dissonance. Figure 1 illustrates dissonance trends. There was a condition × time interaction 
for Dissonance Thermometer scores [F(8, 496) = 5.56, MSe = 18093.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .08] 
and psychological discomfort [F(8, 496) = 2.04, MSe = 2101.10, p < .05, ηp2 = .03]. 
A similar trend was observed in each condition for both measures. In the combined 
intervention condition, mean dissonance remained stable at baseline after the first six trials 
(both ps > .05), peaked after the last six trials (Dissonance Thermometer, p < .001; 
psychological discomfort, p > .05), decreased post-message  (both ps < .001), and stablized at 
follow-up (both ps > .05). In the psychoeducation-only condition, mean dissonance remained 
stable from baseline till after the last six trials (all ps > .05), decreased post-message 
(Dissonance Thermometer: p < .001; psychological discomfort: p < .03), and leveled at 
follow-up (both ps > .05). No fluctuation was observed in the control condition, all ps > .05. 
These results support our hypothesized dissonance trends. 
After the last six trials, mean dissonance (only with the Dissonance Thermometer) 
was higher in the combined intervention condition than in the other two conditions, both ps < 
.001, with no difference between the other two, p > .05. TAF-related cognitive dissonance 
was thus induced with the behavioral experiment trials in the combined intervention 
condition as predicted. 
There was a main effect of condition for post-message differences from baseline for 
Dissonance Thermometer scores [F(2, 123) = 8.71, MSe = 26068.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .12] and 
psychological conflict [F(2, 123) = 3.67, MSe = 3515.56, p < .05, ηp2 = .06]. For both 
measures, there were at least marginally greater reductions in both intervention conditions 
(Dissonance Thermometer: adjusted Ms = -114.90 and -101.75, SDs = 177.31 and 188.15, for 
the combined and psychoeducation-only conditions respectively; psychological discomfort: 
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adjusted Ms = -28.86 and -31.55, SDs = 57.08 and 63.34, respectively) compared with the 
control condition (Dissonance Thermometer: adjusted M = 16.29, SD = 197.40; 
psychological discomfort: adjusted M = -0.44, SD = 72.43), all ps < .05. An exception was 
the combined vs. control condition comparison for psychological conflict, p > .05. Between-
interventions comparisons were not significant, both ps > .05. Our within-initial session 
hypotheses for dissonance reduction were thus supported. 
Process measures. Figures 2a-d illustrate trends for process measure-assessed TAF 
and perceived responsibility, distress, and urge to neutralize upon thinking unpleasant 
thoughts. There was a condition × time interaction for TAF [F(7.68, 480.12) = 14.51, MSe = 
2051.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .19], responsibility [F(7.74, 487.36) = 3.78, MSe = 381.51, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .06], distress [F(8, 504) = 2.34, MSe = 275.76, p < .05, ηp2 = .04], and urge to neutralize 
[F(7.68, 483.82) = 7.66, MSe = 377.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .11]. 
A similar trend was observed in each condition for all variables. In the combined 
intervention condition, only TAF and distress increased from baseline and peaked after the 
first six trials (p < .001 and .04, respectively). All variables dipped after the last six trials (all 
ps > .05), decreased post-message (all ps < .01), and remained level at follow-up (all ps > 
.05). In the psychoeducation-only condition, only distress increased from baseline after the 
first six trials, p < .01. All variables remained stable after the last six trials (all ps > .05), then 
decreased post-message (all ps < .001), and remained level at follow-up (all ps > .05). No 
fluctuations were observed in the control condition, all ps > .05. These results generally 
support our hypothesized trends for these variables. Our hypothesis of maintenance of 
intervention efficacy only in the combined intervention condition was, however, not 
supported. 
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After the first six trials, mean TAF was higher in the combined intervention condition 
than in the other two conditions, both ps < .001, with no difference between the other two, p 
> .043. Mean responsibility was higher in the combined intervention condition than in the 
control condition, p < .01; mean responsibility was not different in other comparisons, both 
ps > .05. Mean distress and urge to neutralize were not different across conditions, all ps > 
.04. Our hypothesis that these variables would peak after thought-congruent trials in the 
combined intervention condition was partially supported. 
There was a main effect of condition for post-message differences from baseline for 
TAF [F(2, 124) = 33.47, MSe = 3204.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .35], responsibility [F(2, 125) = 
8.71, MSe = 654.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .12], distress [F(2, 125) = 8.57, MSe = 401.75, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .12], and urge to neutralize [F(2, 125) = 31.28, MSe = 559.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .33]. For 
all variables, there were at least marginally greater reductions in both intervention conditions 
(TAF: adjusted Ms = -85.91 and -39.83, SDs = 79.10 and 55.16, for the combined and 
psychoeducation-only conditions respectively; responsibility: adjusted Ms = -21.25 and -8.79, 
SDs = 31.78 and 30.77, respectively; distress: adjusted Ms = -8.70 and -2.64, SDs = 26.96 and 
27.97, respectively; urge to neutralize: adjusted Ms = -27.08 and -7.23, SDs = 30.24 and 
34.09, respectively), compared with the control condition (TAF: adjusted M = 13.17, SD = 
56.89; responsibility: adjusted M = 1.57, SD = 32.85; distress: adjusted M = 8.79, SD = 
27.53; urge to neutralize: adjusted M = 12.95, SD = 29.46), all ps < .028. The exception was 
the psychoeducation-only vs. control condition comparison for responsibility, p > .05. There 
were incrementally greater reductions in the combined intervention condition only for TAF 
and urge to neutralize, both ps < .001. Our within-initial session efficacy hypotheses were 
thus mostly supported.  
Scales. Figures 3a-d illustrate trends for scale-assessed TAF, inflated responsibility, 
OC symptom severity, and general psychological distress. There was a condition × time 
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interaction only for TAF [F(4, 256) = 18.14, MSe = 35.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .22], inflated 
responsibility [F(3.58, 229.09) = 47.46, MSe = 85.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .43], and OC symptom 
severity [F(2, 128) = 12.25, MSe = 18.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .16]. 
In the combined intervention condition, TAF and responsibility decreased from 
baseline post-message (both ps < .001), and remained level at follow-up (both ps > .05). In 
the psychoeducation-only condition, the post-message reduction in TAF from baseline was 
not maintained at follow-up, both ps < .001; however, responsibility decreased from baseline 
post-message (p < .001), and remained level at follow-up (p > .05). Both intervention 
conditions showed reductions in OC symptom severity from baseline at follow-up, both ps < 
.001. All three variables were not fluctuant across time in the control condition, all ps > .05. 
These results mostly support our hypothesized trends for these variables; our hypothesis of 
maintenance of intervention efficacy only in the combined intervention condition was 
partially supported. 
There was a main effect of condition for post-message/follow-up differences from 
baseline for TAF [F(2, 127) = 46.07, MSe = 58.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .42], responsibility [F(2, 
127) = 132.20, MSe = 84.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .68], OC symptom severity [F(2, 127) = 16.56, 
MSe = 32.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .21], and distress [F(2, 127) = 3.32, MSe = 54.80, p < .05, ηp2 = 
.05]. There were at least marginally greater reductions in all variables in both intervention 
conditions (TAF: adjusted Ms = -14.79 and -7.86, SDs = 11.01 and 7.95, for the combined 
and psychoeducation-only conditions respectively; responsibility: adjusted Ms = -32.24 and -
15.43, SDs = 10.97 and 9.69, respectively; OC symptom severity: adjusted Ms = -7.37 and -
3.86, SDs = 5.48 and 6.25, respectively; distress: adjusted Ms = -4.25 and -1.70, SDs = 8.80 
and 8.87, respectively), compared with the control condition (TAF: adjusted M = 0.77, SD = 
4.15; responsibility: adjusted M = -0.57, SD = 6.65; OC symptom severity: adjusted M = -
0.44, SD = 6.48; distress: adjusted M = -0.25, SD = 6.45), all ps < .037. The exception was 
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the psychoeducation-only vs. control condition comparison for distress, p > .05. There were 
incrementally greater reductions in the combined intervention condition only for TAF, 
responsibility, and OC symptom severity, all ps < .014. Our within-initial session efficacy 
hypotheses were thus mostly supported. 
Mediation Analyses (Intervention Mechanism) 
We argued that TAF reduction is a plausible mechanism for intervention efficacy. 
Specifically, we hypothesized that TAF reduction will at least mediate the relationship 
between dissonance reduction and OC symptom reduction, if not reductions in other pertinent 
constructs, across conditions. We employed the PROCESS macro for SPSS with bootstrap 
resampling (10,000 resamples) and 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals (CIs; Hayes, 
2013). A bootstrapped estimate of the indirect effect tests for the presence of mediation 
(Hayes, 2009). If the CI does not contain zero, the indirect effect is considered statistically 
significant (i.e., evidence of mediation; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Whether the mediation is 
partial or full can be inferred from the statistical significance of the direct effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable. 
Independent variables were Dissonance Thermometer and psychological discomfort 
baseline-post-message differences. Proposed mediators were baseline-post-message 
differences on process and scale measures of TAF. Dependent variables were baseline-post-
message/follow-up differences in OC symptom severity, inflated responsibility, perceived 
responsibility, distress, and urge to neutralize upon thinking bad thoughts, and general 
psychological distress. Covariates were baseline scores for all aforementioned variables, 
within-initial session dissonance preconditions, EEG-related knowledge, social desirability, 
and preference for consistency (see Dalecki & Willits, 1991).  
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Across conditions, and with all combinations of independent variables and mediators, 
change in TAF showed partial to full mediation of the link between change in dissonance and 
intervention efficacy (i.e., changes in dependent variables). All indirect effects were 
significant, βs = .01–.12, SEs = .003–.04, 95% CIs = [.001–.06, .01–.20], and the direct 
effects were either significant (βs = .03–.15, ts = 2.17–7.09, SEs = .01–.04, ps < .05) or not 
(βs = -.004–.06, ts = -.39–1.52, SEs = .004–.04, ps > .05). No evidence of mediation, 
however, was observed for the link between changes in dissonance and general psychological 
distress, as CIs for the indirect effects contained zero. Therefore, dissonance reduction via 
TAF reduction for intervention efficacy was generally supported as a mechanism for 
observed intervention efficacy. 
Mediation Analyses (Baseline and Change Scores) 
In terms of baseline scores, there was a significant indirect effect when inflated 
responsibility was placed as the hypothesized mediator for the TAF-OC symptoms 
relationship, β = .07, SE = .03, 95% CI = [.02, .14]. The direct effect of TAF on OC 
symptoms was significant too, β = .17, t = 3.00, SE = .06, p < .01, indicative of partial 
mediation by inflated responsibility. To test for the proposed mediator role of TAF instead, a 
reverse mediation analysis was conducted. The indirect effect in this case was also 
significant, β = .06, SE = .03, 95% CI = [.02, .12], as was the direct effect of inflated 
responsibility on OC symptoms, β = .13, t = 2.87, SE = .05, p < .01. Therefore, TAF partially 
mediated the link between inflated responsibility and OC symptoms as well. The mediator 
roles of distress upon thinking bad thoughts and urge to neutralize for the TAF/inflated 
responsibility-OC symptoms relationship were not supported, given that CIs for the relevant 
indirect effects all contained zero. 
Dissonance-Based Thought-Action Separation     23 
 
 
Control variables for mediation analyses with change scores were baseline scores of 
specifically investigated variables, baseline and change scores for general psychological 
distress, and social desirability. Scores across conditions were included on the premise of 
investigating change in general. Post-message change in TAF was hypothesized to mediate 
the relationship between post-message change in inflated responsibility and change in OC 
symptom severity. There was a significant indirect effect, β = .07, SE = .04, 95% CI = [.002, 
.15], while the direct effect was not significant, β = .07, t = 1.73, SE = .04, p > .05, indicative 
of full mediation by change in TAF. This implies absence of reverse mediation of the changes 
in TAF-OC symptoms relationship by post-message change in inflated responsibility. Indeed, 
the CI for the indirect effect in this case (β = .09, SE = .05) contained zero, 95% CI = [-.02, 
.19]. The mediator roles of post-message changes in distress and urge to neutralize upon 
thinking bad thoughts for the changes in TAF/inflated responsibility-OC symptoms 
relationship were similarly not supported, as CIs for the indirect effects all contained zero. 
Discussion 
We investigated whether incremental reductions in OC beliefs and symptoms, as well 
as maintenance of these reductions, would be observed with a dissonance-based behavioral 
experiment implemented before TAF-specific psychoeducation (Marino-Carper et al., 2010; 
Zucker et al., 2002). We also employed mediation analyses to examine dissonance reduction 
via TAF reduction as a mechanism for observed intervention efficacy, as well as the 
relationships between TAF, inflated responsibility, and OC symptom severity, in terms of 
baseline and change scores. 
Our dissonance-based behavioral experiment, conducted with a mock EEG setup 
modified from Rassin et al.’s (1999) procedure, predictably induced TAF-related cognitive 
dissonance to peak after all manipulated trials in the combined intervention condition. This 
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was presumably a function of initially activated TAF beliefs in the thought-congruent trials 
being at odds with the subsequent inability to “cause” unpleasant outcomes in the thought-
incongruent trials. After TAF-specific psychoeducation, dissonance dropped in both 
intervention conditions, but remained stable in the control condition. Therefore, our 
dissonance results, especially for the combined intervention condition, follow the prototypical 
course of dissonance change laid out in the dissonance induction-then-reduction principle of 
psychotherapy (Tryon & Misurell, 2008). This results represent well-controlled evidence for 
employing cognitive dissonance as a manipulable construct in the therapeutic situation for 
OC beliefs and symptoms, similar to dissonance-based interventions for other behaviors such 
as smoking and disordered eating (Becker et al., 2006; Freijy & Kothe, 2013; Stice et al., 
2001). 
Indeed, our study indicates that TAF-related cognitive dissonance can be harnessed to 
improve the efficacy of TAF-specific psychoeducation. The dissonance generation-then-
reduction pattern in the combined intervention condition, when contrasted with simple 
dissonance reduction in the psychoeducation-only condition, and non-fluctuation in the 
control condition, mirrored differences in intervention efficacy across conditions. 
Specifically, both intervention conditions were accompanied by greater reductions in process 
measure- and scale-assessed OC beliefs and symptoms, compared with the control condition. 
More importantly, there were also incrementally greater reductions in most of these variables 
in the combined intervention condition, compared with the psychoeducation-only condition. 
This was attributable to a dissonance-induced, increased receptivity to TAF-specific 
psychoeducation. The additional component of a dissonance-based behavioral experiment 
targeting TAF therefore enhanced assimilation of information contained within the 
psychoeducational message, as expected. Evidence for maintenance of intervention efficacy 
at one-month follow-up only for the combined intervention condition, however, depended on 
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the format of assessment. While reductions in process measure-assessed constructs (inclusive 
of TAF and inflated responsibility) were similarly maintained in the psychoeducation-only 
condition, maintenance of scale-assessed TAF reduction at follow-up was observed only in 
the combined intervention condition. The findings are thus modestly indicative of prolonged 
belief change with our dissonance-based procedure, but nonetheless in line with evidence of 
longer-lasting dissonance-induced belief change in other studies (Draycott & Dabbs, 1998; 
Sénémeaud & Somat, 2009). Interestingly, although previous research has revealed that the 
effects of TAF-specific psychoeducation on TAF and inflated responsibility were not durable 
at even a two-week follow-up (Marino-Carper et al., 2010), our study provides contrary 
evidence in the psychoeducation-only condition, especially with process measure-assessed 
constructs, at a longer follow-up interval. This could perhaps be due to the slight modification 
in the content of the TAF-specific psychoeducational message presented here [i.e., changing 
the TAF-likelihood-self scenario, and additionally mentioning that TAF-likelihood-self 
beliefs are wrong, unlike in Marino-Carper et al. (2010)]. Future research can compare the 
psychoeducational message employed here with that in Marino-Carper et al. (2010) to 
determine whether differences in maintenance of effects can be observed. 
TAF reduction was the salient form of TAF-related cognitive dissonance reduction; a 
substantial link between changes in dissonance and TAF in our mediation analyses supports 
this. More importantly, results from our mediation analyses indicated that while dissonance 
reduction had direct effects on the improvement of OC beliefs and symptoms, reducing TAF 
would also strengthen the association between dissonance reduction and OC symptom 
reduction. Hence, our argument that dissonance reduction via TAF reduction is a viable 
intervention mechanism for reductions in almost all OC beliefs and symptoms investigated is 
supported. This is in line with predictions of the dissonance induction-then-reduction 
principle of psychotherapy (Tryon & Misurell, 2008). Cognitive dissonance has never been 
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examined in relation to OCD research and treatment before. In this study, we have provided 
preliminary evidence for its importance in the reduction of OC beliefs and symptoms, 
especially in combination with TAF reduction. We recommend that cognitive dissonance 
should be explored more extensively in other aspects of conventional OCD treatment (e.g., 
exposure and response prevention, and other cognitive-behavioral techniques) to ascertain its 
role as a mechanism for symptom improvement. Our results also suggest that TAF should be 
targeted in OCD treatment, coinciding with longitudinal studies that have demonstrated the 
importance of OC cognitions in the pathogenesis, maintenance, and improvement of OC 
symptoms (Abramowitz, Khandker, Nelson, Deacon, & Rygwall, 2006; Abramowitz, Nelson, 
Rygwall, & Khandker, 2007; Myers, Fisher, & Wells, 2009). 
Our mediation results with baseline and change scores, as a whole, strongly support 
the core tenets of cognitive models of OCD (e.g., that TAF and inflated responsibility are 
highly relevant to OCD), and, once again, encourage a psychotherapeutic focus on TAF 
beliefs for a significant impact on OC symptom improvement. An important caveat, however, 
is the fact that multiple other factors could interact in contributing substantially to the 
development, and hence, treatment of OC symptoms. While our results with baseline scores 
replicated the gist of past related research (Altın & Gençöz, 2011; Matthews et al., 2006; 
O’Kearney, 1998), our findings with change scores run counter to those of Jónsson et al.’s 
(2011) study that investigated the effects of individual and group cognitive-behavioral 
therapy for OCD. Therein, inflated responsibility reduction, but not TAF reduction, predicted 
OC symptom reduction, after controlling for depressive symptom reduction. This discrepancy 
might, however, be a function of differences in intervention format and specificity, and 
covariates involved.  
Limitations 
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Behavioral experiments are less likely to succeed in disconfirming beliefs if outcomes 
can be future-oriented (Tallis, 1995). In the present study, this was circumvented by the 
design of trials in the combined intervention condition, because even outcomes that might be 
future-oriented were brought into the present to be tested. Additionally, participants in the 
combined intervention condition might retain TAF and/or inflated responsibility beliefs when 
the manipulated nature of the trials was revealed at debriefing in the initial session (e.g., “I 
still believe that my thoughts can influence outcomes because this entire setup is bogus”). 
However, there was an emphasis on the logical extension, “This setup is bogus, which means 
that your belief in your ability to influence/cause those unpleasant outcomes with your 
thoughts in the first six trials is bogus as well”. We believe this served to eliminate any 
reactive tendency to retain such beliefs. 
Despite these methodological safeguards, this study has several shortcomings that 
might limit generalizability of findings. A strong limitation resided in the use of an 
unselected undergraduate sample, with modest ranges in scores for pertinent symptom 
measures. It is unclear whether findings can generalize to other age groups, or samples 
suffering from dysfunction due to clinically significant OC and associated symptoms. 
Clinical trials are thus required. Another limitation stems from the administration of self-
report measures. Additionally, measures were administered at multiple intervals, which might 
incur practice effects detrimental to the veracity of responses at later assessment intervals. 
Lastly, one month might still be too short a follow-up interval to chart maintenance of 
intervention efficacy. Future research should thus consider longer follow-up intervals. 
Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
We hope our findings would invigorate additional examinations of the dissonance-
based behavioral experiment-cum-TAF-specific psychoeducation procedure implemented 
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here in OCD-related clinical trials. For example, OCD patient groups, as well as anxiety 
disorder control groups, can be recruited to determine whether clinically significant 
reductions in TAF (and possibly, inflated responsibility) can be similarly observed, whether 
such gains are actually specific to OC symptom reduction (see Abramowitz, Whiteside, 
Lynam, & Kalsy, 2003; Bailey, Wu, Valentiner, & McGrath, 2014), and whether the 
intervention mechanism of dissonance reduction via TAF reduction applies as well. The 
clinical implications would be considerable. Clinicians can then be urged to focus on 
cognitive dissonance as an important and manipulable element in OCD-related 
psychotherapeutic contexts, as well as the attenuation of TAF beliefs for the improvement of 
OC symptoms.  
A related and broader future research goal might be to determine the differential 
effects of TAF reduction, if any, on different OC symptom subtypes (see Sookman, 
Abramowitz, Calamari, Wilhelm, & McKay, 2005). TAF-specific programs (e.g., refined 
versions of our dissonance-based procedure) could then be implemented to maximize 
treatment efficacy among OC symptom subtypes most likely to benefit from them. It might 
also be interesting to determine whether core elements of our procedure can replicated to 
similarly efficacious extents without a mock EEG setup, considering the limiting factor of 
EEG naivety in suitability of this procedure for most individuals. The scope of the 
psychotherapeutic impact of our dissonance-based procedure can also be widened by 
additionally assessing its effect on thought suppression, a construct highly relevant to the 
dysfunctional management of intrusions and TAF and inflated responsibility beliefs (Purdon, 
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Figure 1. Adjusted mean TAF-related cognitive dissonance for each condition across 
assessment intervals (time: 1 = baseline; 2 = after first six trials; 3 = after last six trials; 4 = 
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Figure 2. Adjusted mean process measure-assessed TAF (Figure 2a) and perceived 
responsibility (Resp; Figure 2b), distress (Dis; Figure 2c), and urge to neutralize upon 
thinking unpleasant thoughts (Neu; Figure 2d) for each condition across assessment intervals 
(time: 1 = baseline; 2 = after first six trials; 3 = after last six trials; 4 = post-message; 5 = one-
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Figure 3. Adjusted mean scale-assessed TAF (Figure 3a), inflated responsibility (Resp; 
Figure 3b), OC symptom severity (OC; Figure 3c), and general psychological distress 
(GenDis; Figure 3d) for each condition across assessment intervals (for TAF and Resp, time: 
1 = baseline; 2 = post-message; 3 = one-month follow-up; for OC and GenDis, time: 1 = 

























Scenarios, Proposed Thoughts, and Outcomes 











Imagine you are 
Person A. Person A 
is at the hospital for 




Person A will 




Person A received a 
diagnosis of cancer. 
 
 
Person A received a 
clean bill of health. 
Imagine you are 
Person A. Person A 
is crossing the road 
while a car 
approaches quickly. 
 
Person A will get 
run over by the car. 
 
Person A was run 
over by the car. 
 
The car slowed to a 
stop while Person A 
crossed the road. 
 
Imagine you are 
Person A. Person A 
is walking down a 
flight of stairs. 
 
Person A will fall 
down the flight of 
stairs and suffer a 
severe head injury. 
Person A fell down 
the flight of stairs 
and suffered a 
severe head injury. 
Person A walked 
down and reached the 
end of the flight of 
stairs. 
 
Imagine you are 
Person A. Person A 
is climbing up a 
ladder fixed to a 
shelf. 
 
Person A will fall 




Person A fell off the 
ladder and suffered 
multiple fractures. 
 
Person A picked out 
an item and came 
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is at the hospital for 





will receive a 








received a clean bill of 
health. 
Your father/mother 
is crossing the road 








was run over by the 
car. 
 
The car slowed to a 




is walking down a 
flight of stairs. 
My father/mother 
will fall down the 
flight of stairs and 




fell down the flight 
of stairs and 




walked down and 
reached the end of the 
flight of stairs. 
 
Your father/mother 
is climbing up a 




will fall off the 
ladder and suffer 
multiple fractures. 
Your father/mother 




picked out an item and 
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You are about to 
engage in a thought 
about another 





you are worthless. 
 
 






Person B/C/D/E is 
unaware of your 
thought. 
 
You are about to 
engage in a thought 
about another 
person (i.e., Person 
B/C/D/E). 
 
I want to give 
Person B/C/D/E the 
middle finger! 
As though you had 




Person B/C/D/E is 
unaware of your 
thought. 
 
You are about to 
engage in a thought 
about another 
person (i.e., Person 
B/C/D/E). 
 
Person B/C/D/E, I 
swear I will stab 
you with a knife! 
 
As though you had 
actually threatened 
him, Person 
B/C/D/E fears for 
his life. 
Person B/C/D/E is 
unaware of your 
thought. 
 
Imagine you are in a 
relationship with 
Person B/C/D/E. 
It will be exciting to 




As though you had 





Person B/C/D/E is 




Note. Participants had either “father” or “mother” as the target in the TAF-likelihood-others 
trials, depending on their initial choice. “Persons B, C, D, and E” each appeared once, in 














B.1. TAF-specific psychoeducational message 
It is estimated that the vast majority of the population has intrusive thoughts. Intrusive 
thoughts are often unpleasant thoughts that come to your mind out of the blue. For example, 
you might be walking down the stairs and have a fleeting thought that you will trip and fall 
down the stairs, or you might have a passing thought about causing harm to a helpless person. 
Or, you might be in a serious relationship and have unpleasant sexual thoughts about people 
other than your partner. Often, when people have these bothersome thoughts they feel as 
though somehow, their thoughts will make the event more likely to happen. This way of 
thinking is wrong. Why is this way of thinking wrong? By simply thinking about yourself 
getting into an accident, for example, you will not increase the chance of that happening to 
you. Your thinking has no effects whatsoever on the risk of an accident happening to you. 
Also, by simply thinking about a friend or family member becoming seriously ill, you will 
not increase the chance that they will become sick. Your thinking has no effects whatsoever 
on their health. Lastly, unpleasant thoughts alone do not mean you are an evil, bad or 
immoral person. Remember, it is completely normal to have these types of thoughts. These 
types of thoughts have no influence over outside events, nor are they a reflection of your 
character. 
 
B.2. Non-TAF-relevant message 
It is estimated that the vast majority of the population is right-handed. Being right-handed 
typically means that the right hand is the dominant hand for writing. For right-handed people, 
the left hemisphere of the brain is typically the dominant one for speech. In other words, 
when a right-handed person produces or comprehends speech, the left side of the brain is 
usually more strongly activated than the right side, when it comes to the linguistic content of 
speech. For left-handed people, while most similarly have the left side of the brain as the 
dominant one for speech, a considerable number have the right side of the brain as the 
dominant one for speech, or a mixture of both left and right sides of the brain for speech. 
Interestingly, different-handed people tend to pick different directions if given a choice to 
head either left or right at a fork in a path. For example, a right-handed person will tend to 
choose to head left at a fork in a path, while a left-handed person will tend to choose to head 
right. There are still individual differences in such preferences though. Therefore, it is 
possible for a right-handed person to choose to head right at a fork in a path, as well as for a 










Process Measures and Check Items 
C.1. Process measures 
Instructions: 
Indicate your response on the line below each question, from “Not at all” at the left end to 
“Very much” at the right end of the line. 
 
C.1.1. TAF-likelihood-self 
Right at this moment, to what extent do you agree with the statement, “Thinking of 
something unpleasant happening to myself increases the risk that it will happen to me”? 
                   Not at all                                                                              Very much 
 
C.1.2. TAF-likelihood-others 
Right at this moment, to what extent do you agree with the statement, “Thinking of 
something unpleasant happening to others increases the risk that it will happen to them”? 
                   Not at all                                                                              Very much 
 
C.1.3. TAF-moral 
Right at this moment, to what extent do you agree with the statement, “Thinking of 
something unpleasant is almost as bad as doing something unpleasant”? 
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Right at this moment, to what extent do you agree with the statement, “Thinking of doing 
something unpleasant is almost as bad as doing it”? 
                   Not at all                                                                              Very much 
 
C.1.4. Dissonance thermometer (modified to reference responses to TAF process measures; 
Devine et al., 1999; Elliot & Devine, 1994)  
Right at this moment, to what extent do you feel uncomfortable specifically about your 
response to (the TAF process measure in question)? 
                   Not at all                                                                              Very much 
 
Right at this moment, to what extent do you feel uneasy specifically about your response to 
(the TAF process measure in question)? 
                   Not at all                                                                              Very much 
 
Right at this moment, to what extent do you feel bothered specifically about your response 
to (the TAF process measure in question)? 
                   Not at all                                                                              Very much 
 
C.1.5. Psychological conflict 
Right at this moment, to what extent do you experience conflict specifically about your 
response to (the TAF process measure in question)? 
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C.1.6. Perceived responsibility 
Right at this moment, to what extent do you feel responsible about unpleasant thoughts about 
yourself and others/your thoughts in the trials? 
                   Not at all                                                                              Very much 
 
C.1.7. Distress 
Right at this moment, to what extent are you distressed/distressed by your thoughts in the 
trials? 
                   Not at all                                                                              Very much 
 
C.1.8. Urge to neutralize 
Right at this moment, to what extent do you want to neutralize/cancel out unpleasant thoughts 
about yourself and others/your thoughts in the trials? 
                   Not at all                                                                              Very much 
 
 
C.2. Criterion, manipulation, and dissonance precondition check items 
 
Instructions: 
Indicate your response on the line below each question, from “Not at all” at the left end to 
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C.2.1. EEG-related knowledge 
How much do you know about the operation of EEG equipment?  
                   Not at all                                                                              Very much 
 
C.2.2. Psychoeducational message comprehension 
By simply thinking about yourself getting into an accident, you will not increase the chance 
of that happening to you.  
True/False 
By simply thinking about a friend or family member becoming seriously ill, you will not 
increase the chance that they will become sick.  
True/False 
Unpleasant thoughts alone do not mean you are an evil, bad, or immoral person.  
True/False 
C.2.3. Non-TAF-relevant message comprehension 
Being right-handed typically means that the right hand is the dominant hand for writing.  
True/False 
For right-handed people, the left hemisphere of the brain is typically the dominant one for 
speech.  
True/False 
For left-handed people, while most have the left side of the brain as the dominant one for 
speech, a considerable number have the right side of the brain as the dominant one for 
speech, or a mixture of both left and right sides of the brain for speech.  
True/False 
C.2.4. Proposed thought adherence 
Did you engage in the proposed thoughts as instructed for all of the previous six trials? 
Yes/No 
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C.2.5. Voluntariness of participation 
To what extent do you feel that you had the choice to participate in all aspects of this session?  
                   Not at all                                                                              Very much 
 
C.2.6. Responsibility for participation 
To what extent do you feel personally responsible for your participation in all aspects of this 
session? 
                   Not at all                                                                              Very much 
 
C.2.7. Expenditure of effort 
How much effort did you put into thinking about the proposed thoughts in the trials? 
                   Not at all                                                                              Very much 
 
